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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Scott Lee Mickelsen, pled guilty to one count of
possession of methamphetamine. He received a unified sentence of seven years, with
two years fixed, but after a period of retained jurisdiction, the sentence was suspended
and he was placed on probation.
On appeal, Mr. Mickelsen contends that the district court erred in denying his
motion to withdraw his guilty plea where his guilty plea was made without his knowledge
of the facts and evidence the State could have used against him and without sufficient
time to weigh the decision; thus, it was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and it
was manifestly unjust to preclude withdrawal of the plea. Mr. Mickelsen also contends
that his sentence represents an abuse of the district court’s discretion because, given
any view of the facts in this case and in Mr. Mickelsen’s life, a sentence of seven years,
with two years fixed, is excessive. Mr. Mickelsen further asserts that the district court
abused its discretion in denying his I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35) Motion for leniency.
After Mr. Mickelsen admitted to violating some of the terms and conditions of his
probation, the district court revoked his probation. Mr. Mickelsen asserts that the district
court erred in revoking his probation.
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
On October 25, 2013, Mr. Mickelsen was invited to an acquaintance’s house to
use drugs.

(Presentencing Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI), p.4; R.(Officer’s

Narrative), p.10.) The next morning, a resident of the home went outside to smoke and
found Mr. Mickelsen in the yard, picking up garbage and talking to himself. (R., p.10.)
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When she asked him to leave, he asked her to retrieve his backpack and sword from
inside the house.

(R., p.10.)

The resident contacted law enforcement and

Mr. Mickelsen was located in the parking lot behind the house.

(R., p.10.)

Mr. Mickelsen’s shoes were still inside the house, so he was wearing the resident’s
shoes. (R., p.10.) When he was informed that he was being arrested for unlawful entry
and possession of stolen property, Mr. Mickelsen began to yell. (R., p.10.) He was
then arrested for disturbing the peace. (R., p.10.) After he was placed inside the patrol
car, Mr. Mickelsen began to bang his head on the window. (R., p.10.) In light of all of
these facts, Mr. Mickelsen was charged with unlawful entry, misdemeanor possession
of stolen property, disturbing the peace, and resisting and obstructing officers. (PSI,
p.4; R., pp.37-38.) When he was searched at the jail, deputies located a baggie on
marijuana and a baggie of methamphetamine in the pocket of the jacket that had been
identified as belonging to Mr. Mickelsen.

(PSI, p.4.)

He was then charged with

misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance and felony possession of
methamphetamine. (PSI, p.4; R., pp.23-24.)
On November 20, 2014, pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Mickelsen pled guilty
to possession of methamphetamine. (11/20/13 Tr., p.7, L.24 – p.8, L.25; p.11, Ls.1014; R., pp.31-34.) In exchange for Mr. Mickelsen’s guilty plea, the State agreed to not
to file a persistent violator sentencing enhancement, and should Mr. Mickelsen be
accepted into a problem-solving court, the State would recommend probation
conditioned on completion of the problem-solving court. (10/20/13 Tr., p.8, Ls.9-25;
R., pp.31-34.) The district court accepted the plea, ordered a PSI, and set the matter
for sentencing. (10/20/13 Tr., p.12, Ls.2-15.)
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At sentencing, defense counsel asked the district court to suspend any sentence
and place Mr. Mickelsen on probation. (1/21/14 Tr., p.26, L.25 – p.27, L.10.) The State
asked for seven years, with three years fixed. (1/21/14 Tr., p.29, L.20 – p.30, L.8.) The
district court sentenced Mr. Mickelsen to a unified sentence of seven years, with two
years fixed, but retained jurisdiction for a period of 365 days. (1/21/14 Tr., p.32, L.18 –
p.33, L.13; R., pp.48-52.)
Approximately two weeks after he was sentenced, Mr. Mickelsen moved to
withdraw his guilty plea. (R., pp.53-55.) Mr. Mickelsen asserted that withdrawal of the
guilty plea was necessary to prevent manifest injustice where: (1) he was coerced into
pleading guilty by his counsel; (2) he pled guilty before he received all the discovery in
his case; (3) at the time of the plea he was represented by an attorney who had
previously prosecuted him; and (4) he was not accepted into a problem solving court as
contemplated by the plea agreement. (R., pp.53-54.)
After a hearing, the district court issued a written decision denying
Mr. Mickelsen’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea, reasoning that: (1) the dialogue in
the change of plea hearing made clear that the decision to plead guilty was
Mr. Mickelsen’s decision and it was made knowingly and voluntarily; (2) Mr. Mickelsen
failed to show how the absence of all the discovery impacted his decision to plead
guilty, particularly where he identified the facts substantiating his guilty plea; (3) the fact
that defense counsel was previously a prosecutor does not establish a conflict and there
was no showing that defense counsel’s employment history had any material effect on
his representation of Mr. Mickelsen; and (4) the district court’s explanation at the entry
of plea hearing put him on notice that there was no guarantee of acceptance into the
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problem solving court, and there was no guarantee that he would be ordered into the
specialty court even if he was accepted. (3/3/14 Tr.; R., pp.84-86.)
Mr. Mickelsen also filed a motion for a sentence reduction pursuant to Idaho
Criminal Rule 35. (R., pp.56-57.) The district court issued a written decision denying
Mr. Mickelsen’s Rule 35 motion. (Supp. R., pp.20-21.)
Mr. Mickelsen timely filed a Notice of Appeal. (R., pp.64-69; Supp. R., pp.76-78.)
After Mr. Mickelsen completed the rider, the district court placed him on
probation. (Augmentation, pp.1-4.)
Fourteen months later, a probation violation report was filed which alleged that
Mr. Mickelsen violated his probation by being discharged from his treatment program,
associating with persons he was prohibited from associating with by his probation
officer, consuming alcohol and using marijuana, being charged with misdemeanor
eluding, and failing to report to his probation officer. (Supp. R., pp.2-12.) Mr. Mickelsen
admitted to violating some of the terms and conditions of his probation.
Tr., p.6, L.13 – p.8, L.22.)

(4/18/16

The State recommended Mr. Mickelsen’s probation be

revoked. (5/31/16 Tr., p.13, Ls.8-11.) Defense counsel recommended the district court
sentence Mr. Mickelsen to some local jail time and then place him back on probation.
(5/31/16 Tr., p.16, Ls.11-12.)

The district court revoked his probation.

(5/31/16

Tr., p.20, Ls.5-6; Supp. R., pp.68-71.)
Mr. Mickelsen is appealing the denial of his Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, his
Judgment of Conviction, the order denying his Rule 35 motion for leniency, and the
revocation of his probation.
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ISSUES
1.

Did the district court err in denying Mr. Mickelsen’s Motion to Withdraw Guilty
Plea?

2.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed upon Mr. Mickelsen a
sentence of seven years, with two years fixed, following his plea of guilty to
possession of methamphetamine?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Mickelsen’s Rule 35
Motion for leniency?

4.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it revoked Mr. Mickelsen’s
probation?
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ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Mickelsen’s Motion To
Withdraw His Guilty Plea
A.

Introduction
Mr. Mickelsen filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea after sentencing. The

district court denied Mr. Mickelsen’s motion. Mr. Mickelsen asserts that the district court
erred in denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea, as Mr. Mickelsen was not aware
of what evidence the State had against him at the time he entered his guilty plea, and
did not have sufficient time to consider the plea agreement and consult with his
attorney. Because Mr. Mickelsen pled guilty without knowledge of the evidence against
him, his guilty plea could not have been knowing, intelligent, and voluntary under I.C.R.
11. Even if this Court finds that Mr. Mickelsen’s guilty plea was entered knowingly,
intelligently, and voluntarily, Mr. Mickelsen demonstrated manifest injustice should he
not be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.
B.

Standard Of Review
Appellate review of the denial of a motion to withdraw a guilty plea is limited to

determining whether the court exercised sound judicial discretion as distinguished from
arbitrary action.

State v. Freeman, 110 Idaho 117, 121 (Ct. App. 1986).

Idaho

appellate courts conduct a multi-tiered inquiry when an exercise of discretion is
reviewed on appeal. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989). The sequence of the
inquiry is: (1) whether the lower court rightly perceived the issue as one of discretion;
(2) whether the court acted within the outer boundaries of such discretion and
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consistently with any legal standards applicable to specific choices; and (3) whether the
court reached its decision by an exercise of reason. Id.
C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Mickelsen’s Motion
To Withdraw Guilty Plea Where His Plea Was Not Knowingly, Intelligently And
Voluntarily Made, And It Was Manifestly Unjust To Preclude Its Withdrawal
Mr. Mickelsen asserts that the district court erred in denying his motion to

withdraw his guilty plea where his guilty plea was made without his knowledge of the
facts and evidence the State could have used against him and without sufficient time to
weigh the decision; thus, it was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and it was
manifestly unjust to preclude withdrawal of the plea.
In Idaho, a plea of guilty must be made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily.
State v. Coyler, 98 Idaho 32 (1976). An appellate court looks at the record as a whole
when determining whether a guilty plea was entered knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily. State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295, 300 (1990).
Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c) provides: “A motion to withdraw a plea of guilty may
be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended; but
to correct manifest injustice the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of
conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw defendant's plea.” I.C.R. 33(c). A
motion to withdraw guilty plea made after sentencing will only be granted to correct
manifest injustice.

Idaho Criminal Rule 33(c); State v. Heredia, 144 Idaho 95, 97

(2007). Because a criminal defendant, in pleading guilty, waives certain constitutional
rights, including the privilege against self-incrimination, the right to a jury trial, and the
right of confrontation, a guilty plea will only be upheld so long as the entire record
demonstrates the plea was made knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily. Id. If this
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standard is not met, manifest injustice has occurred. Id. An appellate court looks at the
record as a whole when determining whether it is manifestly unjust to preclude the
defendant from withdrawing his plea. Carrasco, 117 Idaho at 300.
Here, Mr. Mickelsen was led to plead guilty without having full knowledge of the
facts and evidence that the State would have used against him. (3/3/14 Tr., p.5, Ls.1621.) The plea was entered before Mr. Mickelsen had an opportunity to review all of the
discovery—for example, he had not received the lab report verifying whether the white
substance was a controlled substance. (3/3/14 Tr., p.16-19.) Mr. Mickelsen and his
counsel still had not received the lab results at sentencing; nor did the prosecutor’s file
contain a lab report. (1/21/14 Tr., p.30, L.12 – p.31, L.9.) Further, the Register of
Actions supports Mr. Mickelsen’s claim that no discovery had been served on
Mr. Mickelsen’s counsel at that point in the case.1 (R., pp.1-2.) Thus, Mr. Mickelsen’s
guilty plea was not knowing, intelligent, and voluntary.
Mr. Mickelsen pled guilty early on in the case, at arraignment. (11/18/13 Tr., p.5,
Ls.3-11.) The transcript of his plea indicated Mr. Mickelsen appeared uncertain when
answering some of the questions put to him during the plea colloquy, and such is
demonstrative of his hasty decision to plead guilty at his arraignment on the felony
charge. (11/18/13 Tr., p.5, L.8 – p.11, L.21.) Mr. Mickelsen told the district court that he
was in fact under the influence of medication, alcohol, or drugs, but that he was
coherent. (11/18/13 Tr., p.6, Ls.11-19.)

Defense counsel represented that he did not need any additional time for any
discovery or investigation before Mr. Mickelsen entered his guilty plea. (11/18/13
Tr., p.6, Ls.2-5.)

1
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Further, the Record contained additional evidence of the involuntariness of
Mr. Mickelsen’s plea—on page 30 of the Clerk’s Record Mr. Mickelsen indicated he
apparently he did not believe he had sufficient time with his counsel prior to pleading
guilty where in the document, Acknowledgment of Understanding of Rights in
Arraignment, he wrote and circled “NOT” next to Paragraph 4 which provided: “I have
had adequate time and opportunity to talk to my attorney before arraignment and he
had advised me concerning the arraignment and answered all of my questions to my
satisfaction.” (R., p.30.)
Additionally, when the district court asked him if he felt like he was being
pressured or forced into taking the plea agreement, to which Mr. Mickelsen responded,
“It doesn’t matter, Your Honor. The methamphetamine was mine, and I’d be lying if I
said it wasn’t.” (11/18/13 Tr., p.9, Ls.5-9.)
Finally, the district court was aware of Mr. Mickelsen’s mental health conditions.
Mr. Mickelsen suffers from Bipolar Disorder and Schizophrenia.

(PSI, p.18.)

Mr. Mickelsen was taking medication for his mental health conditions. (PSI, pp.17-18.)
He had a history of suicide attempts in the past. (PSI, p.18.) Mr. Mickelsen had been
having suicidal ideations in November of 2013, just prior to his sentencing hearing.
(Substance Abuse Report, p.2.)
In its analysis of whether manifest injustice would result should Mr. Mickelsen not
be permitted to withdraw his guilty plea, the district court should have considered this
information as demonstrating that the plea was not entered knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily as these factors impeded Mr. Mickelsen’s understanding of the terms of the
plea agreement, and which may have hastened his decision to plead guilty too quickly,
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instead of reviewing the discovery and having additional discussions with his counsel.
(See 11/18/13 Tr.)
In light of all of these factors, the record as a whole demonstrated it was
manifestly unjust to preclude the defendant from withdrawing his plea, and the district
court should have found that it was manifestly unjust to deny Mr. Mickelsen’s motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
II.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Imposed Upon Mr. Mickelsen A
Sentence Of Seven Years, With Two Years Fixed, Following His Plea Of Guilty To
Possession Of Methamphetamine
Mr. Mickelsen asserts that, given any view of the facts, his unified sentence of
seven years, with two years fixed, is excessive. Where a defendant contends that the
sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, “‘[w]here a sentence is within statutory
limits, an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of
the court imposing the sentence.’”

State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997)

(quoting State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Mickelsen does not allege
that his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum.

Accordingly, in order to show an

abuse of discretion, Mr. Mickelsen must show that in light of the governing criteria, the
sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the
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individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4)
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id.
In light of the mitigating factors present in this case, Mr. Mickelsen’s sentence is
excessive.
The Idaho Supreme Court has recognized that Idaho Code § 19-2523 requires
the trial court to consider a defendant’s mental illness as a sentencing factor. Hollon v.
State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999).

The Idaho Department of Correction previously

diagnosed Mr. Mickelsen with Bipolar Disorder and Schizophrenia.2

(PSI, p.18.)

Mr. Mickelsen takes medication to manage his mental health conditions. (PSI, p.17.)
Further, Mr. Mickelsen wanted to be sentenced to mental health court, but because his
ex-girlfriend was participating in that court and the two were ordered not to have a
relationship, he was instead screened for drug court. (PSI, p.19.) However, he was not
accepted into drug court. (1/21/14 Tr., p.23, Ls.11-13.)
Mr. Mickelsen first used alcohol at age 12 and began injecting controlled
substances when he was 13.

(PSI, p.18.)

Mr. Mickelsen realizes that he needs

treatment for his controlled substance use. (PSI, p.14.) The Idaho Supreme Court has
held that substance abuse should be considered as a mitigating factor by the district
court when that court imposes sentence. State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982). In Nice,
the Idaho Supreme Court reduced a sentence based on Nice’s lack of prior record and
the fact that “the trial court did not give proper consideration of the defendant’s alcoholic

While a program specialist with the Idaho Department of Health and Welfare evaluated
Mr. Mickelsen’s records, he concluded that Mr. Mickelsen did not require further mental
health assessment, but recommended that Mr. Mickelsen reach out for help if his
suicidal thoughts continued. (December 4, 2013 letter to the district court.)

2
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problem, the part it played in causing defendant to commit the crime and the suggested
alternatives for treating the problem.” Id. at 91. Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court
has ruled that ingestion of drugs and alcohol resulting in impaired capacity to appreciate
criminality of conduct, could be a mitigating circumstance. State v. Osborn, 102 Idaho
405, 414 (1981).
Mr. Mickelsen expressed remorse for his conduct and took responsibility for his
acts. (11/18/13 Tr., p.9, Ls.8-9; p.11, Ls.10-16.) Idaho recognizes that some leniency
is required when a defendant expresses remorse for his conduct and accepts
responsibility for his acts.

State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982); State v.

Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991).
Based upon the above mitigating factors, Mr. Mickelsen asserts that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing an excessive sentence upon him, failing to take
into consideration his substance abuse issues, his mental health issues, and his
remorse. Had it taken these factors into consideration, it would have imposed a less
severe sentence.
III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Mickelsen’s Rule 35 Motion
For A Sentence Reduction In Light Of The New Information Offered In Support Of His
Rule 35 Motion
Although Mr. Mickelsen contends that his sentence is excessive in light of the
information in front of the district court at the time of his January 21, 2014 sentencing
hearing (see Part II, supra), he asserts that the excessiveness of his sentence is even
more apparent in light of the new information introduced at the hearing on his Rule 35
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motion.

Mr. Mickelsen asserts that the district court’s denial of his motion for a

sentence modification represents an abuse of discretion.
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed to the
sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). “The criteria for examining rulings denying the
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable.” Id. “If the sentence was not excessive when pronounced,
the defendant must later show that it is excessive in view of new or additional
information presented with the motion for reduction. Id.
In support of his motion for a sentence reduction, Mr. Mickelsen told the district
court that, at the time the offense occurred, he had just broken up with a girl that he had
been with for eight years which caused him to briefly turn to drugs. (3/3/14 Tr., p.16,
Ls.1-4.) However, Mr. Mickelsen told the district court that he was done with using
controlled substances, that he “do[es]n’t want that stuff in my life anymore.” (3/3/14
Tr., p.16, Ls.4-5.) Finally, he told the court that he knew he could make probation now,
as he was older and wiser and, like his success at quitting drinking and driving, similarly
he had decided not to use controlled substances.

(3/3/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.14-19.)

Mr. Mickelsen even had a job lined up at Property Geeks, performing construction work
to prepare houses to be sold.

(3/3/14 Tr., p.16, Ls.5 – p.17, L.3.)

Additionally,

Mr. Mickelsen offered to participate in urine testing to demonstrate his sobriety. (3/3/14
Tr., p.17, Ls.5-10.) In light of the extenuating circumstances present at the time of his
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incident and Mr. Mickelsen’s goals and plans for the future, the district court should
have reduced his sentence.
Based on the foregoing, in addition to the mitigating evidence before the district
court at the time of sentencing, it is clear the district court abused its discretion in failing
to reduce Mr. Mickelsen’s sentence in response to his Rule 35 motion.
IV.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Mickelsen’s Probation
Mr. Mickelsen asserts that the district court abused its discretion when it revoked
his probation, because the probation violation did not warrant revocation.
Appellate courts use a two-step analysis in reviewing a probation revocation
proceeding. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105 (2009). First, the appellate court
determines “whether the defendant violated the terms of his probation.” Id. “If it is
determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation, the second
question is what should be the consequences of that violation.” Id.
“A district court’s decision to revoke probation will not be overturned on appeal
absent a showing that the court abused its discretion.” Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105. In
reviewing a district court’s discretionary decision, appellate courts conduct an inquiry “to
determine whether the court correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion, acted
within the boundaries of such discretion and consistently with the applicable legal
standards, and reached its standards by an exercise of reason.” Id.
A probationer is entitled to due process throughout probation revocation
proceedings. State v. Kelsey, 115 Idaho 311, 314 (1988); State v. Done, 139 Idaho 635,
637 (Ct. App. 2004). A probationer must be given a due process hearing before
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probation can be revoked. Kelsey, 115 Idaho at 314. At the hearing, satisfactory proof
of a violation of a probation condition or “any other cause satisfactory to the court” must
be proven. Id. (citing I.C. §§ 19-2602, 20-222).
The applicable legal standard the district court must use to determine whether to
revoke probation depends on whether the violation was willful or non-willful. Id. “If a
knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district court’s decision
to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.” Id. (quoting State v.
Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App. 2001)).

In deciding whether revocation of

probation is the appropriate response to a violation, the court considers whether the
probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether continued probation is
consistent with the protection of society. State v. Jones, 123 Idaho 315, 318 (Ct. App.
1993).
Once a probation violation has been found, the district court must determine
whether it is of such seriousness as to warrant revoking probation. State v. Chavez,
134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000). However, probation may not be revoked arbitrarily.
State v. Adams, 115 Idaho 1053, 1055 (Ct. App. 1989). The district court must decide
whether probation is achieving the goal of rehabilitation and whether probation is
consistent with the protection of society. State v. Leach, 135 Idaho 525, 529 (Ct. App.
2001).

If a knowing and intentional probation violation has been proved, a district

court’s decision to revoke probation will be reviewed for an abuse of discretion.
I.C. § 20-222; Leach, 135 Idaho at 529.
Only if the trial court determines that alternatives to imprisonment are not
adequate in a particular situation to meet the state's legitimate interest in punishment,
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deterrence, or the protection of society, may the court imprison a probationer who has
made sufficient, genuine efforts to obey the terms of the probation order.

State v.

Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 382 (Ct. App. 1994).
Mr.

Mickelsen’s

probation

officer

recommended

a

specialty

court

for

Mr. Mickelsen. (5/31/16 Tr., p.13, L.13 –p.14, L.1.) However, Mr. Mickelsen was not
accepted into Drug Court. (5/31/16 Tr., p.12, Ls.8-10.) Mr. Mickelsen does well on
probation when he has increased reporting and testing and such would have translated
to success in a specialty court.3 (5/31/16 Tr., p.13, L.13 – p.15, L.1.)
Substantial information regarding Mr. Mickelsen’s drug addiction was known by
the district court when it placed him on probation on January 22, 2015, yet the court still
opted to place Mr. Mickelsen on probation. (Augmentation, pp.1-4.) As Mr. Mickelsen
told the district court after his probation violation, “I admit, I had a slip. But part of
recovery is getting back up. I don’t believe that sending me to prison is going to do any
good.” (5/31/16 Tr., p.17, Ls.1-3.) Mr. Mickelsen knew he needed additional treatment
to better be able to handle his addiction, “Rehabilitation is what I need.”
Tr., p.17, L.25.)

(5/31/16

Thus, there were no changed circumstances which would justify

revocation.
Mr. Mickelsen’s violations did not justify revoking probation in light of the goals of
rehabilitation and the fact that the protection of society could be best served by his
continued supervision under the probation department.

Even the district court believed that a problem solving court would have been a good
placement for Mr. Mickelsen. (5/31/16 Tr., p.18, Ls.13-21.)

3
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CONCLUSION
Mr. Mickelsen respectfully requests that this Court reverse the district court’s
order denying his motion to withdraw his guilty plea and remand for further
proceedings.

Alternatively, he requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it

deems appropriate or remand the case back to the district court for a new sentencing
hearing. Alternatively, he requests that this Court reverse the district court’s order
revoking his probation and remand for further proceedings.
DATED this 10th day of August, 2016.

__________/s/_______________
SALLY J. COOLEY
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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